
Auctions
Commercial fishermen, sports fishermen, fishery managers, economists, scientists, processors, and others have argued about the method of initial quota allocation since the inception of IFQ programs. When based solely on catch history, the free gift of quota resulted in a huge economic windfall to large producers while forcing smaller producers out of the fishery. We propose a more equitable and revenue-generating solution to the allocation problem: a royalty-based, periodic auction for any new IFQ programs.
¨ Auction entry: Qualification criteria should give preference to owner operators, conservation enhancement, and long-term participation in the fishery. Also, fishery managers could reserve limited portions (ex. 10%) of the TAC (or equivalent) to be auctioned only to new qualified participants.
¨ Royalty-based payment: Calculated as a percentage of landed fish-pound value, the fisherman's accepted bid will be remitted to the agency by the processor upon payment to the fisherman. A primary benefit is that there is no upfront cash outlay for fishermen, and a secondary, yet important, benefit is that the auction funds management, research, and enforcement necessary for good fishery conservation and management. The percentage royalty helps to solve equity problems because it provides equal opportunity to small and large operators by basing payment on the individual's future catch. The royalty aspect provides more protection from unanticipated fishing losses resulting from inclement weather or stochastic events that might limit fish catches. The regional councils should address quota payment for commercial landings that are not sold, such as personal use catches, on a fishery-specific basis.
¨ Flow of revenue: The income from the auctions will be allocated toward program costs, such as administration, monitoring, and enforcement, within the region governing the IFQ program. Ultimately, the royalty-based auction will benefit the American taxpayer because the IFQ management will require less federal funding than other fishery management programs. Instead of all American taxpayers, the fishermen (indirectly, processors and consumers too) would pay for management and enforcement costs of America's marine fisheries.
¨ Periodicity: The auctions should be recurring in regular 5-year periods to allow proper response to stock reassessment and to provide necessary funding for fishery management. The periodicity also eliminates the treatment of IFQs as private property and would help secure the public ownership of living marine resources.
¨ Equity measures for career fishermen: As determined by the regional council, a single compensation package partially based on catch history should appropriately address equity concerns for fishermen whose bids do not win quota. Upon acceptance of such compensation, a fisherman should acknowledge that re-entry into the fishery is not possible.
¨ Consolidation limits: IFQs should not be transferable with the exception of specific cases deemed emergencies by the regional council. The 5-year sunset provision would eliminate most problems related to transferability while maintaining anticipated benefits of IFQs regardless of consolidation limits. Additionally, on a fishery-specific basis, regional councils should set caps on amounts of IFQs that one fishermen or one vessel can acquire via auctions. A guideline should dictate that one cannot bid on an amount exceeding: 1) 1.5 times the average catch per vessel calculated using the entire fleet's catch over the past five years, or 2) average catch of a single vessel over the past five years calculated as a percentage of TAC or equivalent.
For more information contact:
Harriet Nash
hnash@foe.org
Fisheries Campaigner
(202) 783-7400 ext.123